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Abstract
We explore the Declination, a new metric intended to detect partisan gerry-
mandering. We consider instances in which each district has equal turnout, the
maximum turnout to minimum turnout is bounded, and turnout is unrestricted.
For each of these cases, we show exactly which vote-share, seat-share pairs (V, S)
have an election outcome with Declination equal to 0. We also show how our
analyses can be applied to finding vote-share, seat-share pairs that are possible for
nonzero Declination.
Within our analyses, we show that Declination cannot detect all forms of pack-
ing and cracking, and we compare the Declination to the Efficiency Gap. We show
that these two metrics can behave quite differently, and give explicit examples of
that occurring.
1 Introduction
Irregularly shaped districts have long been a hallmark of gerrymandering in American
democracy. Unfortunately, determining which shapes are justifiable and appropriate is
surprisingly nuanced (see, for example, [3]). Furthermore, the fine-grained demographic
data available to modern mapmakers enables them to achieve partisan aims even when
constrained to reasonable shapes. There is still a need for robust tools capable of mea-
suring how fair or unfair a redistricting plan is in terms of its partisan effects.
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Several new metrics of partisan gerrymandering have been developed in recent years.
Perhaps most famous is the “Efficiency Gap” (EG) defined by Stephanopoulos and
McGhee [7], which played a prominent role in the Supreme Court case Gill v. Whit-
ford [4], concerning redistricting in the Wisconsin legislature. As states or courts impose
specific mathematical requirements on their legislative districting plans it is essential
that measures of partisan fairness are well understood, as there are subtitles that are not
apparent to the casual observer. In the 2018 election Missouri approved an amendment
to the state constitution requiring legislative district maps to be drawn by a nonparti-
san state demographer, and then approved by a bipartisan commission [1]. Among the
requirements for the map makers are to make the Efficiency Gap as close to zero as pos-
sible, while also promoting competitiveness. In Table 3 we show that in elections where
all districts are competitive the Efficiency Gap can quite volatile, and will only be close
to zero when seat margin close to two times vote margin.
More details are included below and in [9], but the intuitive idea underlying the EG is
that gerrymandering involves “packing” and “cracking” of voters. That is, a mapmaker
can pack opponents into a small number of districts which are won with an overwhelming
majority, and then crack the remaining opponents among many districts, which the
opponents subsequently lose. The EG is intended to detect this packing and cracking by
comparing the “wasted” votes for each party in an election. In this formulation, Party
A’s wasted votes consist of any votes above the 50% threshold in a district won by Party
A (packed votes) and all votes for Party A in a district lost (cracked votes). There are
various other metrics intended to detect gerrymandering which do not rely on district
shape, such as the mean-median difference, but we focus in this paper on the analysis of
one such newly defined metric: the Declination.
Warrington recently defined the Declination [10], which is based upon the number
of seats won by Party A, the average vote share for Party A in districts it won, and
the average vote share for Party A in districts it lost. The idea is that if party A has
been packed, its average vote share in districts it won should be unusually high, and if
party A has been cracked, its average vote share in districts it lost should be close to
(but of course below) 50%. Although fairly new, the Declination has gained attention,
including a recent Stanford Law Review article by Stephanopoulos and McGhee [8] who
describe the Declination as a “promising statistic.” We note that the idea of ordering
party A’s vote share district by district (as described below) is also a central idea of the
Gerrymandering Index from [5], although the Gerrymandering Index relies on statistical
sampling techniques.
To define the Declination, consider an election with n districts, where there are two
political parties: A and B. Suppose that party A loses k districts and wins k′ = n − k
districts. We order party A’s vote share in each of the n districts in increasing order:
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pk < 1
2
< pk+1 ≤ · · · ≤ pn
We will also assume that k ≥ 1 and k′ = n − k ≥ 1, because otherwise the Declination
is not defined.
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We now place points in the xy-plane whose y-coordinates are the pis, and whose x-
coordinates are the points 1
2n
+ (i− 1) 1
n
, for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n. More specifically, we have
points
A =
{(
1
2n
+ (i− 1) 1
n
, pi,
)
: i = 1, 2, . . . , k
}
B =
{(
1
2n
+ (j − 1) 1
n
, pj
)
: j = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n
}
Note that A corresponds to points with y-coordinates less than 1
2
(and thus to districts
that party A lost) and B corresponds to points with y-coordinates greater than 1
2
(and
thus to districts that party A won).
We let F be the center of mass of the points in A, H be the center of mass of the
points in B, and G be the point ( k
n
, 1
2
)
. The Declination δ, is the difference between the
angle GH makes with the horizontal and the angle FG makes with the horizontal, scaled
so that it is between -1 and 1. More specifically, say that
F =
(
k
2n
, y
)
H =
(
k
n
+
k′
2n
, z
)
Then we have
θA = arctan
(
z − 1
2
k′
2n
)
= arctan
(
2z − 1
k′
n
)
θB = arctan
(
1
2
− y
k
2n
)
= arctan
(
1− 2y
k
n
)
δ =
2
pi
(θA − θB)
Note that the scaling by 2
pi
is to ensure that −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1. For a visualization of δ,
see Figure 1. Note that since we are assuming a two-party election, Figure 1 will be
symmetric for Party B, and the Declination will have the same magnitude.
For example, consider a state with 8 districts and the election result shown in Table 1
below, and its corresponding visualization in Figure 2. In this case, we have k = 6,
n = 8, y = 0.346, and z = 0.551 giving F = (0.375, 0.346), G = (0.75, 0.5), and
H = (0.875, 0.551). Then δ is essentially equal to 0 because the points F , G, and H are
nearly collinear. Warrington was careful in [10] to not give any particular range of optimal
values for the Declination. However, the design of the metric (as well as Warrington’s
discussion in section 3.2 of [10]) suggests that a Declination near 0 is indicative of a fair
districting map.
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Figure 1: Visualization of Declination
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Figure 2: Visualization of δ corresponding to Example Election from Table 1
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Dist.1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 4 Dist. 5 Dist. 6 Dist. 7 Dist. 8 δ
40.2% 40.2% 40.2% 40.2% 23.4% 55.1% 23.4% 55.1% ≈ 0
Table 1: Example Election
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Figure 3: Visualization of z − 1
2
and 1
2
− y.
One interpretation of δ = 0 is that it implies a certain proportionality as shown in
Figure 3. Specifically, if we think of z− 1
2
as the average surplus in districts won by Party
A and 1
2
− y as the average deficit in districts lost by Party A, then δ = 0 implies the
ratio of average surplus to average deficit is the same as the ratio between the number
of seats won to the number of seats lost. That is, δ = 0 implies
z − 1/2
1/2− y =
k′
k
Before continuing with our analysis of the Declination, we note that the Declination
suffers from a limitation in common with many other metrics, including the Efficiency
Gap. While an attractive feature of these measures is that they are easy to compute
solely from election data and may therefore be more palatable to courts, they are not
affected by the distribution of voters within the districts. For example, see Figure 4.
In Figure 4(a), it appears that the blue party’s population is strategically divided to
minimize its election outcomes, whereas Figure 4(b) seems like a more natural drawing
of boundaries. However, both of these give rise to the election outcomes in Table 1 and
therefore have Declination 0. Indeed, any metric relying solely on election outcomes will
not be able to distinguish between voter distributions such as these. Thus, any such
metric will be unable to distinguish between two (districting, distribution) pairs with the
5
d=0, S=0.25, V=0.397
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
District #s
1 3 5 7
2 4 6 8
Raw
District Total Party 1 % Party 1
1 103 0.402
2 103 0.402
3 103 0.402
4 103 0.402
5 60 0.234
6 141 0.551
7 60 0.234
8 141 0.551
Summary
Vote Share Seat Won Seat Share
Party 1 0.397 2 0.25
Party 2 0.603 6 0.75
ybar 0.3464
zbar 0.5508
d=0 
zbar
0.5512
Points
x-val Y-val
F 0.375 0.346
G 0.750 0.500
H 0.875 0.551
Theta_A 0.3859
Theta_B 0.3889
Declination -0.0019
Based on District %’s
District Total Party 1 % Party 1
1 0.40
2 0.40
3 0.40
4 0.40
5 0.30
6 0.54
7 0.30
8 0.54
Summary-1
Vote Share Seat Won Seat Share
Party 1 0.410 2 0.25
Party 2 0.590 6 0.75
ybar 0.3667
zbar 0.5400
d=0 
zbar
0.5444
Points-1
x-val Y-val
F 0.375 0.367
G 0.750 0.500
H 0.875 0.540
Theta_A 0.3097
Theta_B 0.3416
Declination -0.0203
District %’s
0.40 0.40 0.30 0.30
0.40 0.40 0.54 0.54
Self-Contained
District Total Party 1 % Party 1 Vote Share Seat Won Seat Share
1 0.40 Party 1 0.378 2 0.25
2 0.40 Party 2 0.623 6 0.75
3 0.40
4 0.40 k 6
5 0.15 k’ 2
6 0.15 n 8
 2
(a) Visuall , the districting seems to
crack blue voters here.
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(b) The districting visually looks more
natural here.
Figure 4: Metrics like the Efficiency Gap and the Declination do not take into account
where the voters are within each district.
same outcome, only one of which was drawn with obvious partisan intent.
The paper is organiz d as follows. In Section 2 we give some comparisons between the
Declination and the Efficiency Gap, showing that these two metrics are quite different.
In Section 3, we show that, while the Declination does detect packing and cracking as
defined in Warrington’s paper [10], those definitions are quite restrictive. Broadening
the definitions slightly allows us to provide examples of packing and cracking that the
Declination does not detect. In Section 4 we explore the implications of δ = 0, and
in Section 5 we show how turnout affects vote-share, seat-share pairs (V, S) which have
a corresponding election outcome whose Declination is 0. (The discussion of elections
where all districts have equal turnout is in Section 5.1, while uneven turnout is discussed
in Section 5.2). In Section 6 we show how our analyses can be translated to the case of
δ 6= 0. And finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 7.
2 Some Comparisons of Declination and Efficiency
Gap
The Efficiency Gap is based on the idea of a “wasted vote.” In a district that party A
won, any votes for party A above half the total votes in that district is considered wasted.
In a district that party A lost, every vote for party A is considered wasted. The same
description applies to party B’s wasted votes. The Efficiency Gap is then defined as:
EG =
number of party B’s wasted votes− number of party A’s wasted votes
total votes in the state
(1)
The intuition is that EG = 0 reflects a non-partisan districting plan where each party has
the same number of wasted votes. If turnout in all districts is equal (or, more generally,
if the average turnout in districts that party A won is equal to the average turnout in
districts party A lost [9]), the Efficiency Gap simplifies to the following:
EG =
(
S − 1
2
)
− 2
(
V − 1
2
)
(2)
6
where S is the seat share for party A and V is the statewide vote share for party A.1
The Efficiency Gap hinges on the idea of packing and cracking: any packing is ac-
counted for in party A’s wasted votes in districts it won, while cracking is accounted for
in party A’s wasted votes in districts it lost. The Declination is similar in that it also
intends to detect packing and cracking. If party A is both packed and cracked, y will be
close to 50% and z will be very large, resulting in a large Declination. Indeed, Warrington
made a point of proving that the Declination detects certain definitions of packing and
cracking [10]. But, while both the Efficiency Gap and the Declination focus on packing
and cracking, their definitions get at packing and cracking through very different means.
This does not necessarily imply that the Efficiency Gap and the Declination act differ-
ently, but we show here that, in fact, they do. In our analysis we will consider the cases
when the ratio C of the largest turnout in any district to the smallest turnout in any
district is 1, when the turnout ratio is no more than 4, and when the turnout ratio is
unrestricted.2
If we restrict ourselves to considering elections with equal turnout in all districts,
any election with EG = 0 and fixed vote share V will have seat share S = 2V − 1
2
. In
other words, in this case the Efficiency Gap preferred seat share depends solely on the
statewide vote share of party A, and so every (V, S) pair with EG = 0 lies on the line
S = 2V − 1
2
, see the dark grey line in Figure 5.
On the other hand, given an election with equal voter turnout and δ = 0, the seat
share S of party A is a function of both the average vote share y in districts lost by party
A, and the average vote share z in districts won by party A. Thus the set of (V, S) pairs
with δ = 0 is a 2-dimensional region in the V S-plane, see the dark grey region in Figure
6. In fact, this region covers at least 1
4
of the V S-plane. Indeed, note that for any seat
share with S 6= 0, S 6= 1 it is possible to have an election outcome3 with V = 1
2
and
δ = 0.
Figures 5 and 6 also show vote-share, seat-share pairs (V, S) which give EG = 0 or
δ = 0 when when the largest turnout in any district is no more than 4 times the smallest
turnout in any district, and when the turnout ratio is unrestricted. In each of these cases
(turnout equal, turnout ratio no more than 4, unrestricted turnout), the area covered by
vote-share, seat-share pairs giving EG = 0 is smaller than the area covered by vote-share,
seat-share pairs giving δ = 0. An overlay of Figures 5 and 6 (when turnout ratio is no
more than 4) is given in Figure 7, for more ease of comparison. The specifics of these
figures are discussed in more detail in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
These differences are further highlighted in the contrasting election outcomes from
1McGhee has expressed a desire for the EG to satisfy the Efficiency Principle. Veomett showed that
the definition of EG from equation (1) does not satisfy the Efficiency Principle [9], and thus McGhee has
subsequently suggested that equation (2) become the definition of the EG, even in cases where turnout
is uneven among districts [6].
2We chose to give a picture of when the ratio of max turnout in a district to min turnout in a district
is no more than 4 because this seems to be approximately the largest such turnout ratio seen in recent
elections (see Table 7 below).
3Here the restrictions of S 6= 0 and S 6= 1 are so that the Declination is defined.
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Figure 5: Overlay of pairs of seat shares S and vote shares V that can have Efficiency
Gap 0 when C = 1 (darkest gray), C ≤ 4 (darkest and middle gray), and C unrestricted
(darkest, middle, and lightest gray).
Tables 2 and 3. For all elections in both tables, turnout is assumed to be the same in
each district. In each election from Table 2, every district lost by party A has vote share
25% and every district won by party A has vote share 75% so that the Efficiency Gap is
0. The Declination varies greatly among these elections, and is only equal to zero when
party A wins 50% of the seats, i.e. the Declination preferred seat share is 5.
Election Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dist. 1 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25 % 25%
Dist. 2 75% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Dist. 3 75% 75% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Dist. 4 75% 75% 75% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Dist. 5 75% 75% 75% 75% 25% 25% 25%
Dist. 6 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 25% 25%
Dist. 7 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 25%
Dist. 8 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75% 75%
EG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
δ -0.514 -0.33 -0.161 0 0.161 0.33 0.514
Table 2: Elections with EG=0 and various Declinations
In Table 3, by contrast, both y and z are chosen to be close to 50%. Thus, given the
volatility of the EG, the value of the EG varies widely across all of these elections, whose
Declinations are all essentially 0. Please note that we give the value of EG×2 in Table 3
for ease in comparison since −1 ≤ EG× 2 ≤ 1 and −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
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Figure 6: Overlay of pairs of seat shares S and vote shares V that can have δ = 0 when
C = 1 (darkest gray), C ≤ 4 (darkest and middle gray), and C unrestricted (darkest,
middle, and lightest gray).
Some of the critiques of the Efficiency Gap are not an issue for the Declination. For
example, for V > 75% or V < 25%, there does not exist a seat share S with EG = 0,
regardless of turnout. But for any vote share V there exists some seat share S with
a corresponding election outcome giving δ = 0. (And similarly, for any seat share S
there exists some vote share V with a corresponding election outcome giving δ = 0).
Additionally, some have critiqued the fact that EG does not favor direct proportionality
(S = V ), but we can easily see that even with turnout equal in all districts, given a vote
share V there exists an election outcome with δ = 0 and S = V .
The Declination is susceptible to volatility, which has been another common critique
of the EG [2]. For example, consider the elections in Table 4.
Districts 1, 2, and 9 were the only close races, and those districts flipping from one
party to the other changes the Declination substantially, from δ ≈ −0.228 to δ ≈ 0.515.
One might ask whether this could possibly happen in practice, to which we answer a
definitive yes. Indeed, the data for Election 1 in Table 4 is nearly precisely the outcome of
the 2012 US Congressional election in Arizona, where the percentages are the Democratic
party’s vote share. (We say nearly precisely because some districts had more than two
parties receiving a substantial number of votes). If Districts 1, 2, and 9 had flipped,
Election 2 could have easily been an outcome. Clearly the Declination is still subject to
volatility, and in at least one state the kind of volatility that the Declination is susceptible
to actually does occur.
Though both these tools and others have shortcomings and merits, they have a signif-
icant shortcoming: because they rely on election data only, they cannot themselves show
that map-drawers actually drew a partisan map. That is, perhaps the election data looks
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Figure 7: Overlay of pairs of seat shares S and vote shares V that can have Efficiency
Gap 0 when C = 1 (maroon) and C = 4 (red), versus δ = 0 when C = 1 (light blue) and
C = 4 (dark blue).
suspicious, but maybe the electorate have self-sorted in a way that makes a lopsided seat
share unavoidable.
Both the Efficiency Gap and the Declination rely on election data only, and they both
set out to determine if that data is from a fair election. In elections with EG = 0 the
possible vote-share, seat-share combinations are much more restricted than for elections
with δ = 0. The Efficiency Gap does not indicate that elections with proportional vote-
share and seat share are fair, whereas under certain conditions the Declination does
indicate such elections are fair. The Declination is likely to indicate an election with all
competitive districts is fair, but to behave unpredictably if some districts are competitive
and some are not. The Efficiency Gap can indicate an election with all non-competitive
districts is fair, as long as they are equally non-competitive for both sides. In order to
make good use of either of these metrics it is important to reflect further on which of
these election conditions is desirable. Indeed different states have expressed different
motivations along these lines when making their maps.
3 On Detecting “Packing” and “Cracking”
Before proceeding, we first note that the Declination depends only on percentages, and
thus is invariant under scaling. Thus, any examples containing small numbers of voters
can have turnout uniformly scaled across all districts to give examples with a realistic
number of voters.
Warrington introduced the Declination in [10], and in this article, he defined “crack-
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Election Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dist. 1 49% 49% 49% 49% 48% 47 % 43%
Dist. 2 57% 49% 49% 49% 48% 47% 43%
Dist. 3 57% 53% 49% 49% 48% 47% 43%
Dist. 4 57% 53% 51% 49% 48.5% 47% 43%
Dist. 5 57% 53% 51.5% 51% 49% 47% 43%
Dist. 6 57% 53% 52% 51% 51% 47% 43%
Dist. 7 57% 53% 52% 51% 51% 51% 43%
Dist. 8 57% 53% 52% 51% 51% 51% 51%
EG× 2 0.51 0.42 0.2225 0 -0.2225 -0.42 -0.51
δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Elections Highlighting Differences Between Declination and Efficiency Gap
Dist.1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 4 Dist. 5 Dist. 6 Dist. 7 Dist. 8 Dist. 9 δ
Election 1
51% 50.1% 59% 30% 32% 35% 81% 35% 51% ≈ −0.228
Election 2
49% 49% 59% 30% 32% 35% 81% 35% 49% ≈ 0.515
Table 4: Two sample elections, revealing the Declination’s volatility
ing” as follows:
Define A-cracking to be the moving of party-A votes from district k + 1
to districts 1, 2, . . . , k such that
1. the first k districts are still lost by party A after the redistribution and
2. district k + 1 becomes a district that party A loses.
He also defines “packing” as follows:
Define A-packing to be the moving of party-A votes from district k+ 1 to
districts k + 2, k + 3, . . . , n, such that district k + 1 is now lost by party A.
He then shows that the Declination detects A-cracking and A-packing if p′k+1 > y (where
p′k+1 is the new percentage of votes to party A in that k + 1th district after the cracking
or packing occurs).
First we note that, while “packing and cracking” is widely acknowledged to be the
means by which gerrymandering occurs, there is no well-defined or broadly accepted
definition of packing or cracking. In particular, Warrington’s definition is quite restrictive
in that it only allows shifting votes from district k + 1. If his definition of cracking
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broadened slightly, then we can show that the Declination does not detect the new,
slightly broader, definition of cracking. More specifically, we consider the following:
Definition 1 (Modified A-cracking). Define modified A-cracking to be the moving of
party-A votes from district i ≥ k + 1 to districts 1, 2, . . . , k such that
1. the first k districts are still lost by party A after the redistribution and
2. district i becomes a district that party A loses.
We can keep the original definition of A-packing, but for both packing and cracking
remove the restriction that p′i > y (if pi is the new percentage of votes to party A in
district i, the new district that party A loses). With the following examples, we see that
the Declination does not detect these slightly broader (but still quite narrow) modified
definitions of packing and cracking:
Example 1. Consider the elections in Table 5, whose declinations are visualized in Fig-
ure 8. Note that both have 8 districts. We can witness “modified A-cracking” from
district 8 into districts 1-6. The ratio of maximum voter turnout in a single district in
the state divided by minimum voter turnout in a single district in the state in both of
these elections does not exceed 2.25
Election 1 Election 2
District Votes Turnout Votes Turnout
A B A B
1 4 6 10 4 6 10
2 4 6 10 5 6 11
3 4 6 10 5 6 11
4 4 6 10 5 6 11
5 4 6 10 5 6 11
6 4 6 10 5 6 11
7 6 5 11 6 5 11
8 7 3 10 2 3 5
δ 0.328255 0.3120541
Table 5: Undetected Cracking from district 8 to districts 1-6
Example 2. Consider the elections in Table 6, whose declinations are visualized in Fig-
ure 9. Note that both have 6 districts. We can witness “A-packing” by re-allocating votes
from district 2 into districts 3-6. The ratio of maximum voter turnout in a single district
in the state divided by minimum voter turnout in a single district in the state in both of
these elections does not exceed 2
12
Figure 8: The declinations of the elections in Table 5.
Election 1 Election 2
District Votes Turnout Votes Turnout
A B A B
1 4 5 9 4 5 9
2 5 4 9 1 4 5
3 5 4 9 6 4 10
4 5 4 9 6 4 10
5 5 4 9 6 4 10
6 5 4 9 6 4 10
δ -0.2899492 -0.3349818
Table 6: Undetected Packing by re-allocating votes from district 2 into districts 3-6
For each of the above examples, we pointed out the ratio of maximum turnout in a
single district to minimum turnout in a single district in an effort to argue that these
examples are realistic. Indeed, Table 7 appeared as part of a larger table in [9]. For
Table 7, n and M/m are defined as follows:
n = number of districts in the state
M/m =
maximum turnout in a single district in the state
minimum turnout in a single district in the state
From Table 7, we can see that the ratios of 2.25 and 2 in Examples 1 and 2 are not
outside of the range of what is typically seen in real elections. We also note that neither
Warrington’s original definitions nor the modified packing and cracking definitions use
the geography of the state and would fail to distinguish between situations like those in
Figure 4.
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Figure 9: The declinations of the elections in Table 6.
State AZ CA FL GA IL IN MD MA MI MN MO
n 9 53 27 14 18 9 8 9 14 8 8
M/m 2016 2.15 4.41 1.62 1.55 2.06 1.42 1.18 1.34 1.47 1.19 1.34
M/m 2014 3.03 4.41 1.83 1.77 2.42 1.52 1.31 1.58 1.50 1.19 1.50
State NJ NY NC OH PA TN TX VA WA WI
n 12 27 13 16 18 9 36 11 10 8
M/m 2016 1.96 1.83 1.27 1.34 1.56 1.31 2.82 1.42 1.65 1.53
M/m 2014 2.38 4.00 1.56 1.54 1.83 1.48 4.10 1.65 1.65 1.31
Table 7: Turnout ratios for 2014 and 2016 U.S. House of Representatives elections in all
states with at least 8 congressional districts
4 Elections with δ = 0
First note that throughout we relax our assumptions on the vote shares and allow pk ≤
1
2
≤ pk+1 (as opposed to requiring strict inequality). Note that this does not change
the definition of Declination. The assumption here is that there may be some districts
with half of the votes going to party A and half to party B; some other electoral process
was used to decide which party won in that district. Although exceedingly rare, this
has happened recently in the United States, including a 2015 election for the Mississippi
House of Representatives (where the winner was determined by drawing straws) and a
2017 election for the House of Delegates in Virginia (where the winner’s name was pulled
from a bowl). This also allows the possibility of y = 1
2
or z = 1
2
(or both).
While no specific range of values of the Declination has been suggested to indicate a
lack of partisan bias, the implication of Warrington’s construction and discussion of the
Declination in [10] is that a Declination near 0 indicates that a districting map is fair.
This gives rise to a natural question:
Q: What kinds of election outcomes have δ = 0?
Given the design of the Declination, one clear answer is:
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Fact 1. The Declination is 0 if
k = n− k and z − 1
2
=
1
2
− y
That is, the seat share S is equal to 1
2
, and z = 1− y.
This example seems reasonable: party A’s average winning margin is the same as its
average losing margin, and it wins half of the seats. If turnout in all districts is close,
then this is close to proportional representation.
Another clear instance of the Declination being 0 is:
Fact 2. The Declination is 0 if
y = z =
1
2
k is anything between 1 and n− 1
That is, the seat share S is anything except for 0 and 1, and y = z = 1
2
This example is a little more interesting; every single district is competitive. In fact,
each district is so competitive that the vote was split right down the center. In this
instance, any seat share S which is not 0 or 1 (that is, each party is winning at least one
district) gives a Declination of 04.
We’d like to explore other election outcomes having a Declination of 0. Recall that
θA = arctan
(
z − 1
2
n−k
2n
)
= arctan
(
2z − 1
n−k
n
)
θB = arctan
(
1
2
− y
k
2n
)
= arctan
(
1− 2y
k
n
)
δ =
2
pi
(θA − θB)
so that
δ = 0⇐⇒ arctan
(
1− 2y
k
n
)
= arctan
(
2z − 1
n−k
n
)
⇐⇒ 1− 2y
k
n
=
2z − 1
n−k
n
⇐⇒ z = n
2k
+ y
(
1− n
k
)
4The requirement that S 6= 0 and S 6= 1 is purely so that the Declination is defined.
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Suppose that S is party A’s seat share with 0 < S < 1. This gives (1 − S)n = k,
since k is the number of seats that party A lost. Then we know that the Declination is
0 if and only if
z =
n
2(1− S)n + y
(
1− n
(1− S)n
)
=
(
1− 1
1− S
)
y +
1
2(1− S)
If we solve the above equation for y and S, we have that the Declination is equal to
0 if and only if
y =
(
1− 1
S
)
z +
1
2S
or equivalently in the case of y 6= z
S =
1− 2z
2(y − z)
Thus, we have just proved the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose an election has seat share 0 < S < 1, average vote share in districts
party A lost y (so that 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
), and average vote share in districts party A won z (so
that 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1). Then the Declination of this election is 0 if and only if either
y = z =
1
2
or one of the following equivalent expressions is true:
z =
(
1− 1
1− S
)
y +
1
2(1− S)
y =
(
1− 1
S
)
z +
1
2S
S =
1− 2z
2(y − z)
This idea of writing the relationship between z, y, and the seat share S for elections
with δ = 0, gives rise to the following:
Theorem 1. Choose S to be any rational number between 0 and 1. Depending on the
value of S, make the following choices:
0 < S <
1
2
choose z with
1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
2(1− S)
S =
1
2
choose either y with 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
or choose z with
1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
1
2
< S < 1 choose y with 1− 1
2S
≤ y ≤ 1
2
16
Then there exists an election outcome consisting of those choices, with Declination equal
to 0.
Proof. We prove each case separately.
Case 1: 0 < S < 1
2
In this case, we have chosen z with 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
2(1−S) . Note
1
2(1−S) is
strictly increasing on (0, 1/2), which automatically implies that z is between 1
2
and 1.
Define
y =
(
1− 1
S
)
z +
1
2S
and note that 1− 1
S
< 0. Thus, this guarantees that(
1− 1
S
)
1
2(1− S) +
1
2S
≤ y ≤
(
1− 1
S
)
1
2
+
1
2S
0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
Thus, from Lemma 1 we know that this election has Declination 0.
Case 2: S = 1
2
In this case, we can choose either y or z. Suppose we chose y with
0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
. Define
z =
(
1− 1
1− S
)
y +
1
2(1− S) = 1− y
Then we clearly have 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1 and again from Lemma 1 the election has Declination 0.
The case where we choose z with 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1 is proved similarly.
Case 3: 1
2
< S < 1 is proved similarly to Case 1.
We can visualize the restrictions from Theorem 1 in Figure 10. For 0 < S < 1
2
, we
can choose z in the blue segment above S. This determines y using the linear equation
y =
(
1− 1
S
)
z + 1
2S
.
For S = 1
2
, we could choose y or z in their corresponding red or blue segments above
S = 1
2
. The choice of y determines z and vice versa. In this instance, y = 1− z.
And for 1
2
< S < 1, we can choose y in the red segment above S. This determines z
using the linear equation z =
(
1− 1
1−S
)
y + 1
2(1−S) .
Note that Lemma 1 also gives us a “Declination-preferred seat share” for a set of
election data. That is, given average vote share in districts party A lost y, and average
vote share in districts party A won z, we know that the Declination is 0 if and only if
either y = z = 1
2
, or if
S =
1− 2z
2(y − z)
This inspires the following definition:
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Figure 10: Possible values for y and z, given seat share S and δ = 0.
Definition 2. Suppose an election has average vote share in districts party A lost y
(0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
) and average vote share in districts party A won z (1
2
≤ z ≤ 1) with y 6= z.
Then the Declination-preferred seat share for this set of data is
S =
1− 2z
2(y − z)
Note that for S = 1−2z
2(y−z) ,
∂S
∂y
=
2z − 1
2(y − z)2 ≥ 0
which indicates that, as y goes up (which can be reasonably interpreted as party A getting
more cracked) then S goes up (party A wins more seats). In Figure 11 we can see the
level curves for S = 1−2z
2(y−z) with the allowable values of y and z, a different visualization
of the information in Figure 10. We see, for example, that when the seat share S is low,
y can take on any value but z is quite restricted. Conversely, when S is high, z can take
on any value but y is restricted.
5 The Possible Relationships between Vote Share,
Seat Share, and Turnout when δ = 0
In this section, we explore the following general question:
Q: Fix a seat share S, and fix an upper bound on the ratio of turnout in two districts C.
That is, fix C ≥ 1, and consider only elections where
maximum turnout in any single district
minimum turnout in any single district
≤ C
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Figure 11: Level curves for the function S = 1−2z
2(y−z) .
What are the possible values for the vote share V when the Declination 0?
We will also address the related question:
Q: With the same restrictions as above, what is the most extreme vote share V when the
Declination is 0?
5.1 C = 1
If we set the maximum ratio of turnout in two districts to be 1, we are insisting that
turnout is equal in every district. It is worth noting that, while this is not a reasonable
assumption, it is an assumption that was generally made in discussions of the Efficiency
Gap. We suspect that this is because population must be equal in congressional districts,
as well as the fact that assuming turnout is equal makes the Efficiency Gap reduce to a
simple equation in vote share and seat share.
We have the following Theorem:
Theorem 2. Suppose an election has seat share S and Declination 0. Suppose turnout
in each district is the same. Then the vote share V can take on any rational value in the
following ranges:
if 0 < S ≤ 1
2
S
2(1− S) ≤ V ≤
1
2
if
1
2
< S < 1
1
2
≤ V ≤ 3S − 1
2S
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Proof. Suppose an election has seat share S, turnout in each district is the same, and
Declination is 0. Recall that S is the percentage of districts that party A won. Thus, we
know that
V = (1− S)y + Sz
Case 1: 0 < S ≤ 1
2
Since the Declination is 0, Lemma 1 tells us that y =
(
1− 1
S
)
z + 1
2S
so that
V = (1− S)
((
1− 1
S
)
z +
1
2S
)
+ Sz
= 2z +
1− 2z
2S
− 1
2
Note that ∂V
∂z
= 2 − 1
S
, which is either negative or 0 since 0 < S ≤ 1
2
. Thus, from
Theorem 1 (and the fact that V is continuous in z), we know that V can take on all
values between its minimum at z = 1
2(1−S) and its maximum at z =
1
2
. We now calculate
V when z = 1
2(1−S) :
V = 2
1
2(1− S) +
1− 2 1
2(1−S)
2S
− 1
2
=
S
2(1− S)
and V when z = 1
2
:
V = 2
1
2
+
1− 21
2
2S
− 1
2
=
1
2
Case 2: 1
2
< S < 1 is proved similarly.
The range of possible vote-share, seat-share pairs (V, S) for elections with δ = 0 when
turnout ratio C = 1 is given in Figure 125. The level curves of y and z can also be seen
overlaid in Figure 12.
Example 3. One example of interest (which is typically called “proportionality”) is when
seat share is equal to vote share: V = S. Typically, this is a situation which is seen as
5Note that, although the bounds on V are given in terms of S, we have displayed out figures with V
on the horizontal axis, as that is the standard.
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Figure 12: Pairs of seat shares S and vote shares V that can have Declination 0 when
turnout in every district is the same, overlaid with level curves for y and z.
“fair” and strong deviation from proportionality is often cited as indication of gerryman-
dering. Assuming that V = S, C = 1, and using Lemma 1 we have
V = (1− S)y + Sz
= (1− S)
((
1− 1
S
)
z +
1
2S
)
+ Sz
= 2z +
1− 2z
2S
− 1
2
= 2z +
1− 2z
2V
− 1
2
so that
V 2 +
(
1
2
− 2z
)
V + z − 1
2
= 0
which is a quadratic equation with solutions:
V = 2z − 1 or V = 1
2
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We note that, if V = S = 2z − 1, then from Lemma 1, we have
y =
(
1− 1
S
)
z +
1
2S
=
(
1− 1
2z − 1
)
z +
1
2(2z − 1)
= z − 1
2
which implies that, in the situation of V = S, C = 1, we similarly have
V = 2y
Thus when vote share is equal to seat share, declination is equal to zero and voter
turnout is equal, the average margin of victory for party A is the same as the average
margin of victory for party B.
5.2 C > 1
Suppose we now fix C > 1, fix 0 < S < 1, and consider all election outcomes with seat
share S and Declination 0, such that the ratio of turnouts among two districts is bounded
above by C:
maximum turnout in any single district
minimum turnout in any single district
≤ C
We’d like to find the range of all possible vote shares for such an election. Let
Ci =
turnout in district i
minimum turnout in any district
so that 1 ≤ Ci ≤ C. Then we’d like to find the range of all possible values of
V =
∑k
i=1Cipi +
∑n
j=k+1Cjpj∑n
`=1C`
with the restriction (from Lemma 1) that
Sy + (1− S)z = 1
2
(3)
and the restriction (from Theorem 1)
if 0 < S ≤ 1
2
then
1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
2(1− S)
if
1
2
< S < 1 then 1− 1
2S
≤ y ≤ 1
2
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Recall that S is party A’s vote share, so that S = n−k
n
and 1− S = k
n
. Recalling the
definitions of y and z, equation (3) gives
S
p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pk
k
+ (1− S)pk+1 + pk+2 + · · ·+ pn
n− k =
1
2
S
1− S (p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pk) +
1− S
S
(pk+1 + pk+2 + · · ·+ pn) = n
2
We have the following:
Theorem 3. Suppose an election has seat share S and Declination 0. Suppose that
maximum turnout in any district
minimum turnout in any district
= C
Then if 0 < S ≤ 1
2
, the vote share V can take on any rational value in the following
ranges:
S
2(1− S)(C(1− S) + S) ≤ V ≤
1
2
if C ≤ (1− S)
2
S2
S
2(1− S)(C(1− S) + S) ≤ V ≤
CS
2(1− S)((C − 1)S + 1) if C >
(1− S)2
S2
and if 1
2
< S < 1, the vote share V can take on any rational value in the following ranges:
1
2
≤ V ≤ 2(C − 1)S
2 + 3S − 1
2S((C − 1)S + 1) if C ≤
S2
(1− S)2
C(2S − 1)(1− S) + 2S2
2S(C(1− S) + S) ≤ V ≤
2(C − 1)S2 + 3S − 1
2S((C − 1)S + 1) if C >
S2
(1− S)2
Proof. Case 1: 0 < S ≤ 1
2
In this case there is a restriction on z.
Note that we can re-write this situation as looking for all possible values of
V =
∑k
i=1(Ci − 1)pi +
∑n
j=k+1(Cj − 1)pj +
∑n
s=1 ps∑n
`=1(C` − 1) + n
(4)
with the constraints that
0 ≤ C` − 1 ≤ C − 1 ` = 1, 2, . . . , n
S
1− S (p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pk) +
1− S
S
(pk+1 + pk+2 + · · · pn) = n
2
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
2
i = 1, 2, . . . , k
1
2
≤ pj ≤ 1 j = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n with z ≤ 1
2(1− S)
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Note that this implies that
n∑
s=1
ps = p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pk + S
1− S
(
n
2
− S
1− S (p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pk)
)
=
1− 2S
(1− S)2 (p1 + p1 + · · ·+ pk) +
Sn
2(1− S)
Since 0 < S ≤ 1
2
, we know that 1−2S
(1−S)2 ≥ 0 so that
∑n
s=1 ps is always at least as large as
Sn
2(1−S) . Note that we can think of equation (4) as a weighted average of the pis, pjs, and
pss with the aforementioned constraints. Finally, because 0 < S ≤ 12 , we have S1−S ≤ 1.
Thus, this weighted average is clearly minimized when pi = 0, Ci = C for i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
and Cj = 1 for j = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n. In this case,
V =
∑k
i=1Cipi +
∑n
j=k+1Cjpj∑n
`=1C`
=
0 · Ck + 1
2(1−S)(n− k)
kC + n− k =
1
2(1−S)Sn
(1− S)nC + Sn
=
S
2(1− S)(C(1− S) + S)
Thus, we have our lower bound for Case 1.
To calculate the upper bound for Case 1, we firstly note that if all pis are
1
2
, then the
constraints are satisfied and V = 1
2
. Next, we keep in mind that
S
1− S (p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pk) +
1− S
S
(pk+1 + pk+2 + · · · pn) = n
2
so that if pk+1 + pk+2 + · · · + pn increases by h, then p1 + p2 + · · · + pk decreases by
(1−S)2
S2
h > h. Thus, the only way that
V =
∑k
i=1Cipi +
∑n
j=k+1Cjpj∑n
`=1C`
could be larger than 1
2
is if C ≥ (1−S)2
S2
, in which case the largest possible value for
V would be when pi = 0, Ci = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and pj =
1
2(1−S) , Cj = C for
j = k + 1, k + 2, . . . , n. This gives:
V =
∑k
i=1Cipi +
∑n
j=k+1Cjpj∑n
`=1C`
=
0 · k + 1
2(1−S)C(n− k)
k + C(n− k =
1
2(1−S)CSn
(1− S)n+ CSn
=
CS
2(1− S)((C − 1)S + 1)
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giving the upper bound for Case 1.
Case 2: 1
2
< S < 1 is proved similarly.
Corollary 1. Fix any rational number 0 < S < 1. If 0 < S ≤ 1
2
, then for any rational
V with
0 < V <
1
2(1− S)
there exists an election outcome with seat share S and vote share V .
If 1
2
< S < 1, then for any rational V with
1− 1
2S
< V < 1
there exists an election outcome with seat share S and vote share V .
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 3, by taking limits as C →∞.
Please see Figure 6 (from Section 2) for a visualization of possible vote-share seat-
share pairs for elections with δ = 0, with varying turnout ratios.
6 Vote Share, Seat Share, and Turnout when δ 6= 0
We note that most of the arguments from Sections 4 and 5 can be carried out similarly for
Declination values which are not 0. Firstly, we use the difference of arctangent identity
to see:
δ =
2
pi
(
arctan
(
2z − 1
k′
n
)
− arctan
(
1− 2y
k
n
))
=
2
pi
arctan
 2z−1k′n − 1−2ykn
1 + 2z−1k′
n
1−2y
k
n

=
2
pi
arctan
(
2z−1
S
− 1−2y
1−S
1 + 2z−1
S
1−2y
1−S
)
=
2
pi
arctan
(
(1− S)(2z − 1)− S(1− 2y)
S(1− S) + (2z − 1)(1− 2y)
)
Solving this equation for y, and z, we have
y =
tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S) + 2z − 1) + 1− 2z(1− S)
2(S + tan
(
δpi
2
)
(2z − 1)) (5)
z =
tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S)− (1− 2y)) + 1− 2Sy
2(1− S − tan ( δpi
2
)
(1− 2y)) (6)
We give a few level curves of these equivalent equations in Figure 13.
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(a) δ = 0.1 (b) δ = 0.2
Figure 13: Values of y and z for fixed value of S.
In order to prove a statement parallel to Theorem 1 (and thus a chart parallel to
Figure 10), we first note that
∂y
∂z
= −
(
tan
(
δpi
2
)2
+ 1
)
(1− S)S(
tan
(
δpi
2
)
(2z − 1) + S)2 < 0
so that we know that as y increases, z decreases. Thus, using equations (5) and (6), we
can get a parallel to Theorem 1, by finding the intersections of the intervals
0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S) + 2 · 1− 1) + 1− 2 · 1(1− S)
2(S + tan
(
δpi
2
)
(2 · 1− 1)) ≤ y ≤
tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S) + 2 · 1
2
− 1) + 1− 2 · 1
2
(1− S)
2(S + tan
(
δpi
2
)
(2 · 1
2
− 1))
1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S)− (1− 2 · 1
2
)) + 1− 2S · 1
2
2(1− S − tan ( δpi
2
)
(1− 2 · 1
2
))
≤ z ≤ tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S)− (1− 2 · 0)) + 1− 2S · 0
2(1− S − tan ( δpi
2
)
(1− 2 · 0))
Example 4. To illustrate how we can use these inequalities, we will consider the case
where δ = 0.2. Using the arguments outlined above, we have the following:
Choose S to be any rational number between 0 and 1. Depending on the value of S,
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make the following choices:
if 0 < S <
1
2
− 1
2
(√
5 tan2
(
.2pi
2
)
+ 4− 2
)
cot
(
.2pi
2
)
choose z with
tan
(
.2pi
2
)
S + 1
2
≤ z ≤ tan
(
.2pi
2
)
(S(1− S)− 1) + 1
2(1− S − tan ( .2pi
2
)
)
if S =
1
2
− 1
2
(√
5 tan2
(
.2pi
2
)
+ 4− 2
)
cot
(
.2pi
2
)
choose either y with 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
2
or choose z with
tan
(
.2pi
2
)
S + 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
if
1
2
− 1
2
(√
5 tan2
(
.2pi
2
)
+ 4− 2
)
cot
(
.2pi
2
)
< S < 1
choose y with
tan
(
.2pi
2
)
(S(1− S) + 1) + 2S − 1
2
(
S + tan
(
.2pi
2
)) ≤ y ≤ 1
2
Then there exists an election outcome consisting of those choices, with Declination equal
to δ = 0.2.
This gives Figure 14, which is similar to Figure 10 in the case where δ = 0.2.
Figure 14: Possible values for y and z, given seat share S, δ = 0.2.
In exploring possible (S, V ) pairs when δ 6= 0, the case for bounded C 6= 1 is a bit
more complicated and we will not address it. In the case where C is unbounded, we
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note that one can simply consider the extreme ranges of y and z and note that any V
within those extreme ranges is possible, based on weighting the turnout in districts won
by party A more heavily or less heavily. From Example 4, we can conclude the following:
Example 5. Choose S to be any rational between 0 and 1, and set δ = 0.2. Then,
if 0 < S ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
(√
5 tan2
(
.2pi
2
)
+ 4− 2
)
cot
(
.2pi
2
)
the vote share V can take on any rational value in the range
0 < V ≤ tan
(
.2pi
2
)
(S(1− S)− 1) + 1
2(1− S − tan ( .2pi
2
)
)
and
if
1
2
− 1
2
(√
5 tan2
(
.2pi
2
)
+ 4− 2
)
cot
(
.2pi
2
)
< S < 1
the vote share V can take on any rational value in the range
tan
(
.2pi
2
)
(S(1− S) + 1) + 2S − 1
2
(
S + tan
(
.2pi
2
)) ≤ V < 1
The corresponding (S, V ) pairs can be seen in Figure 15.
Figure 15: Possible values for V and S for unrestricted C, δ = 0.2.
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In the case where turnout in each district is equal C = 1 and δ 6= 0, we can make an
argument similar to that in Section 5.1. That is, when C = 1, we know that
V = (1− S)y + Sz
Using equation (5) or (6), we can come up with two equivalent expressions for V :
V = (1− S)tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S) + 2z − 1) + 1− 2z(1− S)
2(S + tan
(
δpi
2
)
(2z − 1)) + Sz
V = (1− S)y + S tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S)− (1− 2y)) + 1− 2Sy
2(1− S − tan ( δpi
2
)
(1− 2y))
This is a bit more complicated than the case δ = 0, because we no longer have the
minimum and maximum values of V occurring at the minimum/maximum values for z or
y. Nevertheless, one can use Calculus to find where the minimum and maximum values
of V occur, and thus get a range of corresponding V s for a fixed S.
Example 6. Let S be a rational between 0 and 1, and let δ = 0.2. From the above
arguments, we know that
V = (1− S)tan
(
δpi
2
)
(S(1− S) + 2z − 1) + 1− 2z(1− S)
2(S + tan
(
δpi
2
)
(2z − 1)) + Sz
∂V
∂z
= S −
(
tan2
(
.2pi
2
)
+ 1
)
(1− S)2S(
2 tan
(
.2pi
2
)
z − tan ( .2pi
2
)
+ S
)2
Solving for ∂V
∂z
= 0, we find that the only critical point for 0 < S < 1 is
z ≈ 2.11803− 3.15687S
From Example 4, we know we must have
tan
(
.2pi
2
)
S + 1
2
≤ z ≤ 1
This implies that z ≈ 2.11803 − 3.15687S is a critical point when 0.354158 ≤ S ≤
0.487457. These observations give us possible (S, V ) pairs in Figure 16.
7 Conclusions
The Declination is a metric which is based on the average vote share in districts won by
a party, the average voter shares in districts lost by the party, and the way we expect the
election results to look in a state with gerrymandered districts. It is a metric that has a
wide variety of vote-share seat-share pairs that can correspond to an election with δ = 0,
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(a) Curves for V , using z =
tan( .2pi2 )S+1
2 ,
z = 1, and the critical point z ≈ 2.11803 −
3.15687S for 0.354158 ≤ S ≤ 0.487457.
(b) Region is all (S, V ) pairs giving δ = 0.2
when C = 1
Figure 16: Curves and regions from the analysis when δ = 0.2.
as seen in Figure 6. When comparing Figures 5 and 6 (and the overlay in Figure 7), one
can easily see that the Declination can behave quite differently from the Efficiency Gap,
and we saw some specific examples of that in Tables 2 and 3.
The Declination avoids some of the pitfalls for which the Efficiency Gap has been
critiqued. It does not penalize direct proportionality V = S, and for any vote share V
there exists a seat share S and an election outcome having the corresponding vote share
and seat share, with δ = 0. While it can be volatile in certain circumstances, it is not
volatile in the case where all districts are toss-ups (which is where EG is most volatile).
Indeed, in the case where all districts have vote share nearly 50%, any seat share (except
for S = 0 or S = 1, in which case the Declination is not defined) will give a Declination
value close to 0.
In order to make good use of any metric intended to detect gerrymandering, it is
important to reflect further on which of these election conditions are desirable. Indeed,
different states have expressed different motivations along these lines when making their
maps. For example, Arizona’s redistricting commission has prioritizing competitiveness
as one of its central goals in the redistricting process. This can give rise to instances
where the Declination is volatile, as was seen in Table 4. Missouri’s recent constitutional
amendment prioritize both Efficiency Gap close to zero and competitiveness in districting
plans, which Table 3 shows might be at odds. And in every state, various nuances such
as voter distribution throughout the state and turnout rates affect how varying metrics
act on the same districting.
No metric is perfect. The Declination cannot detect all kinds of packing and cracking.
And, just as with all other metrics relying only on election data, the Declination cannot
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differentiate between two maps having the same election outcome, but only one of which
could have been re-drawn so as to have a different outcome. It is another useful metric
which can be added to the toolbox of gerrymandering metrics, with an understanding of
its limitations and eccentricities.
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